The: Foolish HumanWhat skyclad devilry is this?

I heard a great bit on NPR as I drove into work today where Stephen Biddle, a defense analyst who has advised the U.S. military on Afghanistan, was interviewed.  During the interview Biddle was asked to compare the surge in Iraq with the surge in Afghanistan

The surge — President George W. Bush’s decision to deploy an additional 30,000 troops to Iraq — is often credited for the turnaround there. But [Biddle says that was only one piece of the puzzle. He says it was the Sunni Awakening — when Sunni leaders stopped fighting the Americans and joined with them against al-Qaida — that ultimately tipped the scales in favor of the U.S. and its allies.

"The Awakening without the surge would have died under an al-Qaida counterattack," he said. "The surge without the Awakening wouldn't have been nearly large enough to suffocate an insurgency the size of Iraq's. It was the two coming together that made the difference."

Link: Text & audio of the story.

[Disclosure: I think it is important that Mr. Biddle is far more qualified to provide an analysis of the current effects of US foreign policy than I am.  However, being less than qualified has never stopped me from shooting off my mouth...]

I totally agree with Mr. Biddle that the Sunni Awakening played a major role in the initial success of the surge in Iraq.  However it remains to be seen if Sunni Awaking, which is also known as the Sons of Iraq, will have a positive effect on Iraq long term.

Consider the following two groups of information:

Group One: Minority status + privilege = Sunnis

1. The Sunni Muslims make up the minority of the Muslim population in Iraq.
2. The Sunnis live in the more oil rich section of Sothern Iraq.  Having access to oil allowed the Sunnis to enjoy a level of privilege.
3. In addition to this Saddam Hussein was a Sunni, and he provided the Sunnis with a level of privilege not enjoyed by the Shi’a majority.
4. The combination of oil privilege, Saddam privilege, and a minority status did not make the Sunnis any friends among the Shi’a majority who now-a-days controls the government of Iraq.

Group Two Armed Sunnis + Shi’a controlled government – US funding = Potential Problem:

1. During the Sunni Awakening a group of Sunni Sheikhs banded together because they realized that doing so was in their best interest.
2. After banding together under the name “the sons of Iraq,” and they worked with the US to reduce the threats caused by insurgents.
3. The US paid the sons of Iraq for their assistance.
4. The Shi’a majority has expressed concerns about an armed group of Sunnis.  The current Shi’a controled government has absorbed about 1/3rd of the Sons of Iraq into the regular Iraqi Army, leaving about 2/3rds of the group out in the wind.
5. The US army is departing from Iraq, and it would not be unreasonable to assume that the funding of Sunnis will be far less (perhaps non-existent?) in the future.

My point:

The Sunni Awakening was one of the things that undoubtedly lead to the success of the surge in Iraq.  However, even though I hope it is a long lasting success, it remains to be seen if this success will carry into the future.  i.e. it is very possible that hooking up the Sunnis was great short term, but could backfire long term.

So the fact that there is no equivalent of the Sunni Awakening in Afghanistan is going to mean that the US is going to have to employ the surge differently.  My guess is that the surge in Afghanistan will not enjoy the same level of initial (short term) success that it did in Iraq.  I won’t make any long term projections as to how the surge will work out over the aggregate (long term) in Afghanistan… that region is just so unstable, and I don’t have anywhere near enough information to feel comfortable saying what things will look like in a week, let alone what they will look like in six months or a year.